The hermeneutics of religious understanding in a postsecular age by Lewin, David
Lewin, David (2017) The hermeneutics of religious understanding in a 
postsecular age. Ethics and Education, 12 (1). pp. 73-83. ISSN 1744-
9650 , http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17449642.2016.1270507
This version is available at https://strathprints.strath.ac.uk/58971/
Strathprints is  designed  to  allow  users  to  access  the  research  output  of  the  University  of 
Strathclyde. Unless otherwise explicitly stated on the manuscript, Copyright © and Moral Rights 
for the papers on this site are retained by the individual authors and/or other copyright owners. 
Please check the manuscript for details of any other licences that may have been applied. You 
may  not  engage  in  further  distribution  of  the  material  for  any  profitmaking  activities  or  any 
commercial gain. You may freely distribute both the url (https://strathprints.strath.ac.uk/) and the 
content of this paper for research or private study, educational, or not-for-profit purposes without 
prior permission or charge. 
Any correspondence concerning this service should be sent to the Strathprints administrator: 
strathprints@strath.ac.uk
The Strathprints institutional repository (https://strathprints.strath.ac.uk) is a digital archive of University of Strathclyde research 
outputs. It has been developed to disseminate open access research outputs, expose data about those outputs, and enable the 
management and persistent access to Strathclyde's intellectual output.
 1 
The Hermeneutics of Religious Understanding in a Postsecular Age 
David Lewin, University of Strathclyde School of Education 
 
 
Introduction 
This article draws upon philosophical hermeneutics to indicate the rich interpretive 
possibilities that exist within religious traditions themselves. This is in contrast to the reductive 
views of what it means to be religious often associated with more fundamentalist religious 
orientations, which tend to boil down to competing and irreconcilable truth claims. What has 
come to be known as the postsecular age offers an opportunity to reexamine the significance 
of religion in public life by engaging with more nuanced interpretive traditions. This 
hermeneutical (re)turn gives religious perspectives opportunities to demonstrate creative 
relationships with modernity that are not predicated on the assumption that religion is an 
uncritical commitment to be separated from public life. I argue, in fact, that religious 
commitments must be opened up to deliberative culture if either religions or public life are to 
flourish.  
There are several implications for education. First, the problem of indoctrination that 
characterizes much educational theory presupposes the kind of non-deliberative and 
hermeneutically naïve religiosity that I am keen to question. If the terms of the debate can be 
shifted, then we can move beyond problems of indoctrination. Second, religious education can 
operate as a space in which deliberative culture can be nourished. By this I mean that religious 
educators need to take seriously that the different views of students are not simply private 
preferences in a plural world, but bear upon the lived experience of meaning. To disregard the 
FODLPVWRµWUXWK¶, as some phenomenological approaches do, is not simply a mark of tolerance 
and inclusion. Third, faith schools demonstrate just how much distance there is between a 
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QDUURZ µSURSRVLWLRQDOLVW¶ FRQFHSWLRQ RI UHOLJLRQ, where orthodoxy is expected, and a more 
embedded religiosity in which religious identity is as much orthopraxy as orthodoxy. But 
religious identity in schools in fact undercuts the very conception of correctness contained in 
both orthodoxy and orthopraxy. Finally, and more broadly, the postsecular indicates a relation 
between religion and education that rejects any lingering progressivism in which 
secularization, disenchantment, and criticality are aligned with good modern education. 
 
Understanding Religion  
Political promiscuity has become popular in the UK in recent years as political gaming 
has reached new levels not only of idealism but also of cynicism. For some this offers 
opportunities to make opponents less electable. For others there is a serious possibility that one 
should simultaneously be part of multiple political parties, or at least that political engagement 
should be seen well beyond party politics. Whether being part of multiple political parties 
breaks certain social norms or party rules, it seems at least a practical possibility, and, for the 
purposes of what follows, suggests interesting parallels for religious identity. Commitment to 
multiple political communities can be justified in terms of fostering deliberative culture, 
learning, engaging, and belonging as widely as possible. It seems at least partly possible to 
view religious engagement and belonging in similar ways. The postsecular age can define the 
space in which many people find themselves: between the confessional commitment to a single 
religious community and the rejection of religion tout court. This could be characterized as a 
theoretical case developed between confessionalism and atheism. I argue that being religious 
is more than just a set of beliefs to which one subscribes. I want to argue for understanding 
religions deliberatively: as discursive communities that both express but also form ultimate 
concerns. From this point of view, it is less of an issue to commit to at least some dimensions 
of multiple religious lifeworlds. Just as one can enact multiple political principles through a 
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wide engagement with political institutions, so one can engage in religious understanding 
through participation in a range of different religious lifeworlds. This requires a certain shift in 
understanding what it means to be religious, since religious commitments appear to involve 
exclusive and absolute claims, a view that has a rather provincial history and context. 
This may seem controversial. It is widely believed that religious people make exclusive 
and absolute claims, and that many religious people understand their own position in just such 
terms. Christians believe that Jesus Christ is the one and only incarnation of the word of God. 
For Muslims, WKH4X¶UDQLV*RG¶VILQDODQGXQVXUSDVVDEOHUHYHODWLRQDevout Jews would begin 
morning prayers thanking God for not having been made heathen. And this exclusivism applies 
also to forms of poly-theism and a-theism: the eternal Dharma of Vedic Hinduism pronounces 
that the almighty power of the Supreme Divinities is only One: Brahman. Buddhists take the 
eightfold path to be the only way to enlightenment. Then there is the atheist belief in the non-
existence of God or gods. 
The impression that religions entail absolute and exclusive claims leads to the 
secularizing idea that religion should be a private concern that must not inform public life. In 
this sense, many religious people are secularists: not that they necessarily exclude all other 
religious views as false, but they regard their religious commitments as a private matter that 
need not infringe upon public life. The history of secularism shows that it has traditionally been 
understood as a key protection of religious rights where minority religious groups might 
otherwise be threatened by a majority. However, it is also true that many people (religious and 
otherwise) recognize that religion cannot be contained within the private sphere, as it is 
intrinsically public-facing. Acknowledging that religion and public life are never entirely 
separable, even if we would prefer that they were, the emergent iQWHUHVWLQWKHµSRVWVHFXODU¶
offers one approach to come to terms with the ongoing influence of religion on public life. 
Religion cannot be separated from public life partly because it goes far deeper than the level 
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of an individual conscious commitment to a set of truth claims (that may or may not be 
exclusive and absolute). Religion is much less a set of personal beliefs as it is a social bond, 
inevitably influencing public life and education. This influence may be regarded with less 
suspicion if we understand religion less in terms of the confessional framings of particular 
religious traditions and see it more in terms of the ultimate concerns that express the human 
search for that which exceeds the finite. The reduction of religions to sets of beliefs or 
worldviews is one that reflects our post-enlightenment conception of what religion, and 
particularly religious language, is about (Smith 1987). Indeed, one might wonder whether the 
prominent nature of religious conflict in present geopolitics is itself (at least in part) a product 
of a secular framing of religion, a discourse that clothes itself in a veil of objective neutrality. 
This is because the fundamentalism of contemporary geopolitics, and the associated violent 
religious ideologies that we see around the world, are partly a result of a kind of reactionary 
religiosity derived from the identification of religion with propositional truth claims that 
inevitably come into conflict. 
So I want to approach this problem partly through recognizing that religious life is less 
to do with belief and worldview than is often assumed. The propositional view of religion, in 
which religions are identified with particular truth claims or worldviews, is generally unhelpful 
when it comes to understanding the religious lives of many, perhaps most, religious 
communities today. 
One response to reductive views of being religious within modern educational 
discourse is to shift the emphasis from belief to practice, evident in the shift from orthodoxy to 
orthopraxy. Fundamentally, this shift raises similar questions of exclusivism and absolutism, 
which will be addressed later. There is a middle ground that I find somewhat more appealing: 
fusing understanding and practice, such that understanding has to be practiced rather than 
assented to. This could be called practising doctrine rather than replacing an emphasis on 
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doctrine with an emphasis on practice. Rowan Williams seems inclined to something like this 
when he says: 
All the major historic faiths, even Islam, which is closest to the propositional 
model at first sight, assume in their classical forms an interaction between forms 
of self-imaging and self-interpreting, through prayer and action, and the formal 
language of belief; that language works not simply to describe an external 
reality, but to modify over time the way self and world are sensed. (Williams 
2012, 16) 
 
Here Williams suggests how the educational idea of formation (Bildung - educational 
formation through what Williams calls self-imaging) has a rich theological history, and that 
religions offer vital resources for Bildung. Moreover, Williams is arguing that doctrinal 
propositions do not simply stand for truths; we should not employ doctrines to enact the binary 
of belief/non-belief. In addition to expressing doctrinal content, religious propositions might 
be said to operate poetically upon the souls of religious people and communities. In other 
ZRUGVWKHFODVVLFDOSURSRVLWLRQVDQGFUHHGVRIUHOLJLRXVWUDGLWLRQVVHHPWRLQYROYHµSUDFWLFH¶
more than cognitive assent. From this point of view, the Christian creeds are less statements of 
belief about how the world is, than a performance of the heart, mind, and soul in relation to a 
living tradition. The lingering cognitivism that stands behind the Protestant idea of a 
commitment to religious statements as being true or false suggests also a conception of 
subjectivity and decision that Wendy Brown characterizes as follows: 
 
The conceit of religion as a matter of individual choice . . . is already a distinct 
(and distinctly Protestant) way of conceiving religion, one that is woefully inapt 
for Islam and, I might add, Judaism, which is why neither comports easily with 
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the privatized individual religious subject presumed by the formulations of 
religious freedom and tolerance governing Euro-Atlantic modernity. (Brown 
2013, 17) 
 
Although I believe these challenges to the popular conceptions of religion are 
important, they also generate other problems. The argument should move towards the 
recognition of the hermeneutical traditions immanent within religious traditions themselves. I 
would like to argue for a deliberative religiosity in which religious attitudes are not assumed 
to be inviolable and irreconcilable, where religious views are in dialogue with their own (and 
perhaps other) traditions, such that religious positions and attitudes are open to critical 
encounter. But such a deliberative model of religious culture seems to entail something akin to 
the propositional framing of religion and a conception of a reasoning subject+DEHUPDV¶PRGHO
of communicative rationality appears wedded to a rather narrow kind of discursive reason. For 
religious positions to be meaningfully explored in relation to each other, do we not depend on 
something like the propositional frame?   
If we try and shift the discussion from propositions to practices, the problem of 
irreconcilability is not overcome. Indeed, practices can be seen as even more irreconcilable 
than worldviews. Consider, for instance, practices around food. Halal and Kosher meat have 
recently been particularly controversial among some secular states, resulting in the banning of 
the religious slaughter of animals. Whether the industrial slaughter of the secular meat industry 
can be justified is another story, but the point here is that religious practices appear even less 
open to the kinds of deliberative cultures that I might propose. The real concern seems more to 
do with drawing out the hermeneutic traditions that are immanent to religions themselves. 
Clearly, foregrounding the hermeneutic traditions that characterize religions involves some 
kind of shift of the propositional framing of religion. But it is not an appeal to orthopraxy over 
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orthodoxy. It may be the prefix ortho that needs to be critically interpreted. The root ortho 
refers to being straight, upright, rectangular, regular; true, correct, proper. Has this come to 
mean something rather too fixed and inflexible, either to be enforced by theocracy or, in liberal 
states, to be placed in the private sphere? We are left with an unpalatable choice: either religion 
is enforced by the state, or states situate ± and therefore distort ± religion. Is the way out of this 
double-bind hermeneutical: that traditions explore transformative interpretations of 
themselves? Does this idea of what it means to be religious do violence to those religions less 
inclined to hermeneutic complexity, for whom unalloyed revelation has no hermeneutical 
conditions? 
 
Hermeneutics 
Paul Ricoeur summarized his hermeneutical relation to understanding as follows: 
³WKHUHLVQRVHOI-understanding that is not mediated through signs, symbols and texts; in the 
ODVW UHVRUW XQGHUVWDQGLQJ FRLQFLGHV ZLWK WKH LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ JLYHQ WR WKHVH PHGLDWLQJ WHUPV´
(1986, 15). For Ricoeur, along with Gadamer and Heidegger, the hermeneutical relation refers 
not primarily to textual interpretation, but to interpretations of the self, the other, and the world. 
What he calls the long route to the self, and to interpretation in general, by way of the mediating 
other, entails an acknowledgement of a constructed moment in (self) understanding. This is an 
ancient paradox: we need the self to see the self. For Ricoeur, there is no direct route to 
understanding, no unmediated experience of the self, world, or, it would seem, God. This is the 
foundation of the hermeneutical condition: we cannot not interpret the world in human terms. 
This might be read as an outrageous denial of religious insight by a philosopher who sailed too 
close to the theological wind but who also emphatically wished to remain a philosopher rather 
than a theologian. A central claim of most religious traditions and practitioners would, at first 
VLJKWEHRSSRVHGWR5LFRHXU¶VPHGLDWLRQ of religious experience. Revelation is the unmediated 
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experience of God, rendering mediation not a universal phenomenon, but a problem to be 
overcome by contact with the unalloyed truth. The idea that religious experience is constructed 
gave lethal ammunition to many of the great atheists, who, like Feuerbach, claimed that God 
is nothing more than a construction, or projection, of human nature. How can a philosopher 
like Ricoeur justify such an apparently postmodern reduction of religion to experiences 
mediated through signs, symbols, and texts? 
In response to atheist confrontations, but also as a consequence of larger shifts within 
modernity, many philosophers of religion have come to terms with the projected nature of 
religious experience without thereby denying the significance, even the revelatory possibility, 
of that experience (Dupré 1998). One can - indeed today one must - acknowledge the projected 
aspects of human experience without thereby asserting that (religious) experience is only a 
KXPDQSURMHFWLRQ5LFRHXU¶VKHUPHQHXWLF phenomenology allows for a mediation between the 
projected and the revealed or, as Ricoeur frames it, between the manifestation of truth and the 
historical proclamation that follows (Ricoeur 1995). This hermeneutical account recognizes 
the constructed moment within religious understanding and experience. Most of us are familiar 
with the atheist critique that God is a projection of the religious subject3HUKDSVZHGRQ¶W
realise that this idea (or a form of it) is also a central insight of Christian theology (and a part 
of all the great religions). The difference is that, for the theologian, *RG LV QRW µMXVW¶ the 
projection, but the projection is the vehicle by which something can be encountered. In other 
words, the ways in which we µfigure the sacred¶ (Ricoeur 1995) are attempts to open the 
religious subject, to make the religious subject sensitive to (or able to think) that which exceeds 
thought. This entails a theological dialectic between the lightness and darkness of God, 
between knowing and unknowing. As Henri Duméry has put it: 
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Consciousness is projective, because it is expressive, because its objective 
intentionality cannot fail to express itself, to project itself on various levels of 
representation. This does not mean that these representations themselves 
become projected upon the objective essence, or upon the reality which this 
essence constitutes. When contemporary phenomenologists write that the thing 
itself becomes invested with anthropological predicates and becomes known 
through those predicates, they merely allude to the need to represent the object 
in order to grasp its intrinsic meaning with all the faculties of the incarnated 
consciousness. But they do not deny that the object, the objective meaning, the 
³WKLQJLWVHOI´RUGHUVGLUHFWVUXOHVWKHFRXUVHRIWKHVHUHSUHVHQWDWLRQV. (Duméry 
quoted in Dupré 1998, 10-11) 
 
The constructed moment of religious experience is here used to deconstruct the idol of 
absolute revelation upon which absolutist and exclusivist claims are built. Thus revelation of 
God always entails the interpretive instruments of the religious subject, whether that is through 
texts, dialogues, feelings, or other experiences. 
There are, of course, significant problems with stating this. Primarily, this account 
appears to deny the experience of the religious subject herself which seems, at least from her 
perspective, to be undeconstructable. It would seem implausible to imagine that the religious 
subject would listen to the philosopher of religion, that their experience is not what they think 
it is. As Morimoto has said: ³>F@alling to them from the outside to abandon those absolutist 
claims will not achieve what it intends, even with a goodwill appeal to mutual respect and 
world peace´0RULPRWR 2005, 180). If this is true for the philosopher of religion, how much 
more true is it for the secularist who is sceptical of mDQ\ NLQGVRI UHOLJLRVLW\0RULPRWR¶V
argument is correct; the effort to question the absolutist claim from a philosophical analysis 
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imposed from without is likely to be less effective than the recognition of the hermeneutical 
context of religious experience from within the religious tradition itself. In essence, my 
argument is that religious traditions have exactly those deconstructive or, better, deliberative 
resources within them and so do not rely upon the philosophical analysis from without to 
recognize the dialectical nature of their own experiences and traditions. It rather depends on 
what we mean when we refer to something as sacred. 
 
Must the sacred be sacred 
Many secularists, atheists, and religious people share a propositional framing of 
religion, leading to the interpretation of plural religious views as necessarily irreconcilable. 
The sacred is marked off from the secular or profane by virtue of its sanctity. That sanctity 
cannot be determined by the religious subject but imposes itself, or makes a claim, upon that 
subject. As revelation, the religious subject has no choice but to receive religious insight, which 
interrupts his or her own projective capacities. This makes the insight or revelation of religion 
inviolable, opposes revelation and human reason, and thereby seals off revelation from 
deliberative inquiry. If religious views are inviolable in this way, then the only logical 
possibility seems to be the separation of private and public, whereby the public is free of any 
religious influence.  
Despite long and complex histories of mediation between reason and revelation, the 
story of the strong separation of reason and revelation is a relatively recent one, reflecting the 
secular framing of religion (Milbank 1990; Smith 2014). The attempt to create a neutral zone 
RU³]RQHRIDEVHQFH´:DUQHU9DQ$QWZHUSHQDQG&DOKRXQIRUWKHSURWHFWLRQRIOHJDO
political, and educational independence, free of religious influence, requires us to adopt an 
extremely limited account of religion. This division reinforces the tendency to reduce education 
WRVFKRROLQJVLQFHµSULYDWH¶IRUPVRIXSEULQJLQJKRPHLQIRUPDOHGXFDWLRQHWFWend to be left 
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out of the debates about public education, which too easily becomes synonymous with 
schooling. 
So if the straightforward secularist division between private and public is unsatisfying, 
what are our options? Whatever forms of secularism/postsecularism seem reasonable, the 
requirements of political life press upon us the need for some kind of shared understanding. So 
I suggest a need for some practical, if not fully theoretical (or theological), consensus. In this 
UHVSHFW , VKDUH5LFRHXU¶VSUHIerence for philosophical rather than theological methodology. 
This consensus acknowledges something of the historical dialectic of the postsecular that I 
have just outlined. It cannot be denied that something profound is at stake in how we bring 
children and young people into the world: a set of commitments is implied that cannot be 
bracketed out. This calls not for the choice between indoctrination into an inviolable 
worldview, versus a neutral education where value-laden formation is excluded. We cannot opt 
out of indoctrination insofar as it is an essential aspect of upbringing, since any formative 
process entails decisions about what we take to be of significance. Rather it calls first for the 
recognition that something profound is at stake, and an understanding that our formative 
FRQWH[WZLOODOZD\VDOUHDG\EHLPEXHGZLWKDµGHFLVLRQ¶RURULHQWDWLRQFRQFHUQLQJZKDWPDWWHUV
So rather than see the educator as taking a position, it is better to recognize that an orientation 
to the world is already undertaken in the processes of education. 
Rowan Williams offers a helpful account of procedural secularism, in which religious 
views are taken up alongside other perspectives (humanist; atheist) to inform a properly 
deliberative public sphere (Williams 2012). Williams rightly rejects the more extreme 
programmatic secularism of a pure French Republic in which no reference to religion can enter 
the public domain.1 So Williams¶SURFHGXUDOLVWDFFRXQWVHHPVWRPRYHLQWKHGLUHFWLRQRID
Habermasian communicative rationality in support of meaningful pluralism. But the pluralism 
RI:LOOLDPV¶DFFRXQWVHHPVWRPHQRWIXOO\GHOLEHUDWLYH, in the sense that his discussion does 
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not give attention to the important process of finding the theological and practical limitations 
RIµJLYHQ¶UHOLJLRXVYLHZV:HPXVWLQRWKHUZRUGVEHDEOHWRRSHQGLVFXUVLYHFKDQQHOVWR
aspects of religions that might appear beyond the realms of public debate. The framing of 
inviolability and irreconcilability with its singular, logical, secular outcome encourages us to 
look past the possibility that religious views need not be antagonistic to deliberative culture. 
)DLWKSRVLWLRQVDQGUHOLJLRXVOLYHVQHHGQRWEHWUHDWHGDVµVDFUHG¶DQGXQTXHVWLRQDEOHRXWVLGH
the realm of deliberative debate. Indeed, respect for religious views must entail a capacity for 
deliberation. For example, if someone simply grants me my private religious view on the basis 
that it is my personal religious right and nothing to do with them, then the actual message is 
not one of respect, but that there is nothing really at stake; that religion is a personal preference, 
a lifestyle choice. Barnes is concerned about the educational relativism that fails to take 
commitment seriously, arguing that many adherents of religion feel that: 
 
«WKHLUUHOLJLRXVEHOLHIVDQGYDOXHVDUHPLVUHSUHVHQWHGE\HGXFDWLRQDODLPVDQG
methods that imply the equal truth of all religions. They conclude that there is 
no true respect for religious difference, for true respect acknowledges the right 
of religious believers and traditions to define themselves and not to have 
imposed on them the kind of fluid relativist identities that follow from liberal 
theological commitments. (Barnes 2009, 13) 
 
%DUQHV¶YLHZLVIDLUO\FRQYHQWLRQDO,WUHWDLQVWKe liberal notion that belief should not 
be imposed upon. However, it does not go far enough since it does not imply the deliberative 
encounter that places those commitments in creative tension that might produce fruitful 
dialogue. I would rather have my own attitude and orientation scrutinized and challenged so as 
to better understand its grounding in reality. This would entail an encounter with other people 
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that does not bracket out the most important aspect of human identity: the meaning of things; 
what matters. Nor does this kind of deliberative attitude require us to import alien ideas and 
practices to traditions that are defensive, conservative, or resistant to dialogue. This is because, 
in fact, many histories of religious interpretation and practice reveal a living tradition in 
dialogue with itself, as the rich and rather neglected history of semiotics shows (Stables & 
Semetsky 2015). The Christian church, for example, entails a complex history between schism, 
reform, tradition, and transformation. Islam, often framed as particularly antithetical to 
modernity, has similar deliberative and interpretive histories and possibilities (Radwan 2015). 
None of this is to deny the tensions and violence that often attend tradition, change, reform, 
and revolution within religious institutions, nor that there are tensions here between religion 
and modernity. But generally, tension and violence are dimensions of wider social pressures 
and changes, too easily solely or primarily attributed to religious histories. The capacity for 
reflection and renewal is an important aspect of any religion. Of course, this account might 
underestimate the complexities of managing dialogue between opposing and conflicting 
positions within the classroom. The argument, that hermeneutical subtlety and deconstructing 
the propositional nature of religion will facilitate a better appreciation of the interpretive 
context of the student, is not, of course, intended as the final word, but as progressing a complex 
theoretical case that is largely absent. My argument should suggest, though, that the very idea 
of people standing for faith positions that may or may not be opposed already concedes so 
much to an unhelpful framing of the debate. 
So if religion cannot be pressed out of public life, are we authorized to question the 
inviolability of particular religious positions? Who is authorized to do so? Who am I to suggest 
to any religious person that their view may be partial: partially constructed by the projecting 
subject? Is it not a public responsibility to do just this? No doubt there are more and less 
sensitive ways of engaging in such public deliberation around religious identity. But generally 
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speaking, those with some religious literacy (and they may or may not be religious themselves), 
will understand that capacity for deliberation is not just a possibility, but is a vital necessity, 
now more than ever. At their best, Religious Education classes in schools can provide not just 
an affirmation of different traditions or irreconcilable positions, or reinforcement of a cultural 
QDUUDWLYHWKDWELQGVDFRPPXQLW\WRLWVSDVWDQGIXWXUHEXWVSDFHVIRUUHIOHFWLRQRQRQH¶VRZQ
and each other¶V religious upbringing and assumptions. Students might expect less to justify 
their own belief in the existence of God than to explain the meaning of some religious doctrines 
or to explore the significance of symbols. Dialogue within and beyond the classroom should 
then not be about justifying answers, as examination questions will often require (Strhan 2010, 
23-25), but coming to a mutual understanding that explores the scope and limits of the symbolic 
DQG PHWDSKRULFDO DVSHFWV RI WUDGLWLRQ 2QH FRXOG VD\ ZLWK 5LFRHXU WKDW RQH¶V VHOI
understanding is only really possible in encounter with another, that, as we saw with the 
opening quotation, the self is constituted through and by the other (Ricoeur 1990).  
 
Deliberative religiosity 
To illustrate the deliberative model, ,ZLOOEULHIO\GUDZXSRQ*HUW%LHVWD¶VDQDO\VLVRI
democratic processes in education. 2  For Biesta, educational theory and practice does not 
generally reflect a deliberative democratic culture, but is increasingly under the sway of a 
UHSUHVHQWDWLYHGHPRFUDWLFPRGHO7KHUHSUHVHQWDWLYHPRGHOWDNHVHDFKLQGLYLGXDO¶VYLHZLQWR
account through an aggregating process; typically, in democracies, through a system of voting, 
with the majority view forming the general will. This common sense view of democracy has 
some problematic features. 
5HSUHVHQWDWLYH GHPRFUDF\ µUHVSHFWV¶ WKH LQGLYLGXDO SUHIHUHQFHV RI LWV FLWL]HQs by 
leaving them intact, and aggregates those preferences to form a general will. This process 
DVVXPHV WKDWHDFKFLWL]HQ¶VSUHIHUHQFHV DUH LQYLRODEOHDQG LQDOLHQDEOH$SUREOHPZLWK WKLV
 15 
model is that politicians develop policies and ideas in accordance with majority preferences, 
caricatured as policy derived through focus group. The political role is then conceived not as 
one of forming, engaging, and shaping public opinion, but rather of following the majority 
view. There are, no doubt, many problems with supposing that politicians should form public 
opinion, rather than respond to it, not least the implied paternalism. But it is generally 
unproblematic to presume that some views are more considered than others, and that some 
authority is legitimately conferred upon those with more considered and principled views. 
Clearly, it is easy and tempting to overdraw this binary: in reality, politics cannot exist without 
principle, any more than it can entirely ignore public opinion. This simplified view of 
democratic representation throws light when applied to education. 
Along with many educational philosophers, Biesta expresses concerns about the 
increasingly economistic relationship between teachers and students across formal education 
(Biesta 2006). In the context of his critique of the learning culture, learners are framed as 
customers, educators as providers, and education the consumable. Put simply, the economistic 
model places the educator in service of the inviolable preferences of the student as consumer. 
This market model is problematic, argues Biesta, because it fails to distinguish between market 
approaches and professions. In FRQWUDVWWRWKHµVWXGHQWDVFRQVXPHU¶PRGHOWKHSURIHVVLRQDO
model (e.g. law, medicine, education) requires the producer to inform and refine the 
preferences of the consumer. The doctor does not respond to the whims of the patient through 
prescribing what is requested without question, but informs the patient of their needs following 
professional consultation and judgment. A profession does not leave the preferences of the 
consumer intact, but informs and refines them through an educational process. It is obvious 
that the infant who wants only to eat chocolate and watch cartoons should not have those 
desires met without hesitation. But the commodification of education structures the educational 
transaction in such a way that it encourages providers not to challenge or refine consumer 
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preferences, but to leave them intact, as inviolable and given desires to be satisfied by the 
market. This market model is clearly inappropriate for framing educational relationships. 
Teachers have a kind of authority that sales people seldom do. They are there to guide students, 
not just to satisfy preferences. The culture of student satisfaction in higher education in the UK, 
for example, has been criticized for enacting this transactional framing of education. The goal 
of satisfying students is corrosive of the properly educational relationship that ought to exist 
between students and teachers (White 2013). So Biesta argues for the deliberative culture of 
education to be recognized, in which desire satisfaction must defer to the more educational 
concern of desire formation.  
Can this kind of deliberative culture be developed within discussions around the place 
of religion in public life? If we accept that some religious activities and ideas are intrinsically 
public facing (e.g. wearing religious symbols at work or school; certain Islamic laws around 
finance), we must also accept that those beliefs and practices, and the particular forms that they 
take, are not given and inviolable. When we recognize the capacity of religious interpretations 
to vary and change with time and context, then we open up hermeneutic conversation. The 
capacity to critically assess beliefs and practices does not mean, of course, that we must 
SULYLOHJH D µQHXWUDO¶ VHFXODU DXWKRULW\ that can demand that religions reinterpret their own 
tradition in heteronomous terms. In other words, drawing out the deliberative structures within 
religious traditions is a very different approach to requiring religions to conform to a putatively 
neutral secular state. I am suggesting that religions have, on the whole, the capacity for 
deliberative practices within them, and where resistance to that deliberation exists (such as the 
flat fundamentalisms of modern religious discourse, notably but not exclusively in forms of 
Christianity and Islam), there are particular and peculiar historical, social, political, and 
economic circumstances that go beyonG ZKLOH VWLOO LQFOXVLYHRI µUHOLJLRQ¶ per se. In sum, 
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religions are not homogenous fixed points whose tenets are simply revealed and therefore 
unquestionable. 
So the idea that we should question the absolutism of a particular religious tradition is 
something that would best occur from within a religion, rather than being imposed from outside 
(e.g. by a secular public). That might be taken to mean that the hermeneutical relations that 
constitute religious life can only really be acknowledged from within a particular church 
community. The immanent deliberations of a particular community may be the most effective 
form of hermeneutical recognition. But it may be that a more generalised acknowledged 
religiosity has some qualities in common with religious others HYHQZKHQ WKH µFRQWHQW¶RI
belief varies. As Morimoto puts it:  
 
If religion is all about giving assent to these divisive sets of doctrines, there is 
little chance for us to understand each other well.  But if religion is primarily a 
matter of trust, piety, devotion, loyalty and commitment, then we all are 
somehow able to perceive what we have in common, regardless of tradition.  
The content of faith may be different, but its quality is similar; and this 
awareness of similarity may hopefully cultivate within us a kind of empathy 
towards each other. (Morimoto 2005, 180) 
 
Conclusion 
This article draws attention to a number of problems faced when considering the place 
of religion in education in a religiously plural world: first, the alignment of education and 
criticality, which is too often regarded in opposition to religion and credulity; second, the 
reduction of religious life to doctrinal positions or propositional truth claims; third, the notion 
that religious claims are, by their very logic, necessarily irreconcilable; and finally, that 
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therefore religious views are inviolable and should be insulated from deliberative culture, such 
as can be found in good schools. If we can demonstrate that religions do not operate 
fundamentally as dogmatic positions, then a key constraint on mutual recognition and dialogue 
might be removed. This is not to replace a propositional view of religion with an orientation to 
practices, but rather to excavate the hermeneutical ground that informs both. Fundamentalist 
revisionist religiosity may be disregarding the hermeneutical complexity that informs religious 
traditions, and this trend must be examined critically if we are to create a more deliberative 
culture in which religious literacy can be taken seriously. 
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1 While understandable given contemporary media discourse, this picture of the French Republic as entirely 
hostile to any public forms of religious expression is as misleading as it is commonplace. For a clear account of 
the ways in which French public life does not exclude religious influence see Arthur, Gearon, and Sears (2010, 
Chapter 1). 
2 For a summary see Biesta (2006, 19-21). The arguments are developed further in Biesta (2010; 2013). 
                                                 
